In this essay I argue that given Donnellan’s formulation of the attributive uses of definite descriptions, as well as Kripke’s [6] and Salmon’s [10] generalized accounts, most uses of definite descriptions that are taken to be attributive turn out not to be so. In building up to my main thesis, I first consider certain problematic cases of uses of definite descriptions that do not neatly fit into any category. I then argue that, in general, a complete definite description we use (...) is complex, in which there is an embedded singular term that is used referentially. From this I conclude that an attributive use of a definite description is an extremely rare linguistic phenomenon, much less frequent than what Donnellan, Kripke, and Salmon have presupposed; so much so that the standard examples given by Donnellan of the attributive use of definite descriptions do not qualify as attributive. (shrink)

What does it mean for a general term to be rigid? It is argued by some that if we take general terms to designate their extensions, then almost no empirical general term will turn out to be rigid; and if we take them to designate some abstract entity, such as a kind, then it turns out that almost all general terms will be rigid. Various authors who pursue this line of reasoning have attempted to capture Kripke’s intent by defining a (...) rigid general term as one that applies to the objects in its extension essentially. I argue that this account is significantly mistaken for various reasons: it conflates a metaphysical notion (essentialism) with a semantic one (rigidity); it fails to countenance the fact that any term can be introduced into a language by stipulating that it be a rigid designator; it limits the extension of rigid terms so much that terms such as ‘meter’, ‘rectangle’, ‘truth’, etc. do not turn out to be rigid, when they obviously are; and it wrongly concentrates on the predicative use of a general term in applying a certain test offered by Kripke to determine whether a term is rigid. (shrink)

A lot has been said about how the notion of reference relates to the notion of knowledge; not much has been said, however, on how the notion of referencerelates to our ability to become aware of what we do not know that allows us to be curious. In this essay I attempt to spell out a certain type of reference I call ‘inostensible’ that I claim to be a fundamental linguistic tool which allows us to become curious of what we (...) do not know. In the first part, I try to explicate the notion of inostensible reference, both for singular and for general terms, as well as full declarative sentences, and in the second part, I argue that our capacity to enjoy conceptual curiosity is essentially based upon our aptitude for inostensible reference. (shrink)

In this paper I respond to and elaborate on some of the ideas put forth on my book The Philosophy of Curiosity (2012) as well as its follow-up “Curiosity and Ignorance” (2016) by Nenad Miščević, Erhan Demircioğlu, Mirela Fuš, Safi ye Yiğit, Danilo Šuster, Irem Günhan Altıparmak, and Aran Arslan.

Despite the recent increase in interest in philosophy about ignorance, little attention has been paid to the question of what makes it possible for a being to become aware of their own ignorance. In this paper, I try to provide such an account by arguing that, for a being to become aware of their own ignorance, they must have the mental capacity to represent something as being unknown to them. For normal adult humans who have mastered a language, mental representation (...) of an unknown is enabled by forming linguistic expressions whose content is grasped, but whose referent is unknown. I provide a neo-Fregean, a neo-Russellian, and then a unified account of this. On that basis, I then argue further that the content of ignorance can always be captured by a question. I then distinguish between propositional ignorance and non-propositional ignorance and argue that propositional ignorance attributions can be of three types, that-ignorance, whether-ignorance, and fact-ignorance. I conclude by arguing that the acquisition of truths, even when it yields knowledge that is certain, does not always eliminate one’s ignorance and that there is a degree of ignorance in almost everything we claim to know. (shrink)

I argue that Millianism has the very odd consequence that there are simple direct questions that Millians can grasp, but they cannot answer them in the positive or the negative, or in some other way, nor could they say that they do not know the answer.

In this paper I respond to the objections put forth by Kresimir Agbaba 22: 1-6) against my earlier paper 20: 7-13) in which I argue that given Donnellan's formulation|as well as Kripke's and Salmon's gen- eralized accounts|an attributive use of a denite description is a very rare linguistic phenomenon.

There are two sorts of singular terms for which we have difficulty applying Donnellan’s referential/attributive distinction: complex definite descriptions, and proper names. With respect to the uses of such terms in certain contexts we seem to have conflicting intuitions as to whether they should be classified as referential or attributive. The problem concerning how to apply Donnellan’s distinction to the uses of certain complex definite descriptions has never been debated in the literature. On the other hand there have been attempts (...) to extend Donnellan’s distinction to the uses of proper names, the most popular one being due to Kripke. However the argument Kripke gives to this end in his ‘Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference’ seems to be inconsistent with the position he takes in Naming and Necessity. I suggest that the reason we seem to have conflicting intuitions with respect to the uses of such terms, is because there is not one but two separate distinctions inherent in Donnellan’s examples; a pragmatic distinction based on the speaker’s intentions in using a term , and an epistemic one based on the notion of having an object in mind. In the light of this, I argue that the issue of whether there are attributive uses of proper names, in the latter sense, relates to the epistemic problem of whether a speaker can have de re attitudes toward an object that he does not have in mind. On this epistemic issue Kripke and Donnellan are on opposite sides as revealed by their debate over the issue of whether there are contingent a priori propositions. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that given Donnellan’s formulation of the attributive uses of definite descriptions, as well as Kripke’s [6] and Salmon’s [10] generalized accounts, most uses of definite descriptions that are taken to be attributive turn out not to be so. In building up to my main thesis, I first consider certain problematic cases of uses of definite descriptions that do not neatly fit into any category. I then argue that, in general, a complete definite description we use (...) is complex, in which there is an embedded singular term that is used referentially. From this I conclude that an attributive use of a definite description is an extremely rare linguistic phenomenon, much less frequent than what Donnellan, Kripke, and Salmon have presupposed; so much so that the standard examples given by Donnellan of the attributive use of definite descriptions do not qualify as attributive. (shrink)

The scope of this short paper is to show that the examples Ilhan Inan uses to undermine Donnellan's distinction fall short on account of wrong interpretation those examples were provided with in his paper. Whilst Ilhan Inan showed how complex definite descriptions may cause doubts as to which category they should be put in, these referring terms only play a secondary role. I argue that all of his three key examples are, in fact, sheer attributive uses of definite descriptions and (...) have to be taken as such, which seriously diminishes the pedestal Inan places his argument on. (shrink)

Ilhan Inan’s (2012) approach to curiosity is based on the following central theses: (i) for every question asked out of curiosity there is a corresponding term (definite description) that is inostensible for the asker (its reference is unknown) and that has the function of uniquely identifying an object; (ii) the satisfaction of curiosity is always in the form of com- ing to know an object as falling under a concept. This model primarily covers curiosity as our search for empirical objectual (...) knowledge. In my critical reflections, I explore some phenomena of non-objectual curiosity which are left out or at least not sufficiently explored by Inan: curiosity as the search for explanation and understanding, and meta-curiosity— curiosity about the very representations, i.e. how to conceptualize a certain problem, and what defi nite descriptions to use in the first place. (shrink)

Ilhan Inan’s book The Philosophy of Curiosity is an exploration of understanding human curiosity and its relation to the use of language. He introduces the notion of inostensible reference (or reference to the unknown) that renders an interesting question possible. He claims that our aptitude for this kind of reference is what enables us to become aware of our ignorance and be curious. For him, there are two ways in which a proposition could be inostensible to a subject: one possibility (...) is when the whole sentence’s truth value is unknown to the subject, the other possibility is when the subject knows the proposition to be true but does not know the fact that makes the proposition true, which he later calls inostensible knowledge. The former case requires an awareness of ignorance to generate curiosity, and the latter case requires an awareness of inostensibility of one’s knowledge to be conducive to curiosity. In this paper, what I would like to do is mainly to draw attention to the often neglected awareness of inostensible knowledge and explore its relation to curiosity. I also claim that, contrary to Inan’s idea that the only way of having inostensible knowledge is when there is at least one inostensible concept in the proposition, there is another possibility of inostensible knowledge, which would correspond to a case in which all the terms are ostensible to the speaker and the proposition is known to be true, but the proposition as a whole is still inostensible. I would like to argue that such an awareness of inostensibility of knowledge is a key step in evaluating one’s epistemic contact with reality and accordingly determining the degree of one’s knowledge on the epistemic scale. I believe this awareness will implicitly raise the standard of knowledge and hopefully foster curiosity, in its broader meaning of caring to know. I will further suggest that the acquisition of ostensible knowledge, which is a form of objectual knowledge of a fact, could also enable the corresponding proposition to be known better by the subject. This claim of mine might be thought of as an attempt to argue for the gradability of propositional knowledge, which has been a controversial issue in epistemology. (shrink)

In this book, Ilhan Inan questions the classical definition of curiosity as _a desire to know._ Working in an area where epistemology and philosophy of language overlap, Inan forges a link between our ability to become aware of our ignorance and our linguistic aptitude to construct terms referring to things unknown. The book introduces the notion of inostensible reference. Ilhan connects this notion to related concepts in philosophy of language: knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description; the referential and the (...) attributive uses of definite descriptions; the _de re/de dicto_ distinction; and Kripke’s distinction between rigid and accidental designators. Continuing with a discussion of the conditions for curiosity and its satisfaction, Inan argues that the learning process—starting in curiosity and ending in knowledge—is always an effort to transform our inostensible terms into ostensible ones. A contextual account is adopted for the satisfaction of curiosity. It then discusses the conditions of successful reference to the object of curiosity and its presuppositions. The book concludes with a discussion on the limits of curiosity and its satisfaction. (shrink)

Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 1 Abrol Fairweather Part I Epistemic Virtue, Cognitive Science and Situationism The Function of Perception 13 Peter J Graham Metacognition and Intellectual Virtue 33 Christopher Lepock Daring to Believe: Metacognition, Epistemic Agency and Reflective Knowledge 49 Fernando Broncano Success, Minimal Agency and Epistemic Virtue 67 Carlos Montemayor Towards a Eudaimonistic Virtue Epistemology 83 Berit Brogaard Expanding the Situationist Challenge to Reliabilism About Inference 103 Mark Alfano Inferential Abilities and Common Epistemic Goods 123 (...) Abrol Fairweather and Carlos Montemayor Part II Epistemic Virtue and Formal Epistemology Curiosity, Belief and Acquaintance 143 Ilhan Inan Epistemic Values and Disinformation 159 Don Fallis Defeasibility Without Inductivism 181 Juan Comesaña Part III Virtues of Theories and Virtues of Theorists Acting to Know: A Virtue of Experimentation 195 Adam Morton Is There a Place for Epistemic Virtues in Theory Choice? 207 Milena Ivanova Bridging a Fault Line: On Underdetermination and the Ampliative Adequacy of Competing Theories 227 Guy Axtell Epistemic Virtues and the Success of Science 247 D Tulodziecki Experimental Virtue: Perceptual Responsiveness and the Praxis of Scientific Observation 269 Shannon Vallor A Matter of Phronesis: Experiment and Virtue in Physics, A Case Study 291 Marilena Di Bucchianico Part IV Understanding, Explanation and Epistemic Virtue Knowledge and Understanding 315 Duncan Pritchard Understanding as Knowledge of Causes 329 Stephen R Grimm Knowledge, Understanding and Virtue 347 Christoph Kelp. (shrink)

In this paper, I dwell on a particular distinction introduced by Ilhan Inan—the distinction between ostensible and inostensible use of our language. The distinction applies to singular terms, such as proper names and definite descriptions, or to general terms like concepts and to the ways in which we refer to objects in the world by using such terms. Inan introduces the distinction primarily as an epistemic one but in his earlier writings (1997: 49) he leaves some room for it to (...) have some semantic significance i.e., the view that in certain intensional de re contexts whether a term occurring in a sentence is ostensible or inostensible may have a bearing on the semantic content of the sentence. However, in his later writings e.g., The Philosophy of Curiosity, he appears to abandon his earlier thoughts regarding the semantic significance of his distinction. He says: “the ostensible/inostensible distinction is basically an epistemic one.... It is an epistemic distinction that has no semantic significance” (2012: 65). I argue that there are indeed such intensional contexts in which the distinction has some semantic significance, i.e., whether a term is ostensible or inostensible has in fact a bearing on what proposition is expressed by the sentence in which the term occurs. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungIn wertpluralen Gesellschaften begegnen uns in der medizinischen Versorgung zahlreiche Konflikte, bei denen die kulturellen und religiösen Wertvorstellungen und Einstellungen des Patienten eine wichtige Rolle spielen. Besonders komplex wird es, wenn die betroffene Person nicht mehr in der Lage ist, selbst über die medizinischen Maßnahmen zu entscheiden. Ob eine Patientenverfügung in solchen Konfliktsituationen einen entscheidenden Beitrag zu einer ethisch angemessenen Lösung leisten kann, bleibt eine berechtigte Frage. Im Folgenden werden die ethischen Aspekte im Umgang mit muslimischen Patienten und die Nutzung (...) einer kultursensiblen und kultursensitiven Patientenverfügung bei diesen Patienten differenziert behandelt.Die Vielfalt an Haltungen zu Entscheidungen am Lebensende innerhalb der islamischen Welt, der Einfluss der Familie und traditioneller sittlicher Einstellungen, heterogene Formen der Religiosität und das Gesundheitssystem des jeweiligen Landes erweisen sich als wichtige normative Anhaltspunkte für die Anwendung einer Patientenverfügung bei muslimischen Patienten. Trotz zahlreicher Schwierigkeiten kann eine kultursensible und kultursensitive Patientenverfügung einen wichtigen Beitrag zur Berücksichtigung und Umsetzung der Entscheidungen eines entscheidungsunfähig gewordenen muslimischen Patienten leisten. (shrink)

Background: For an effective treatment of patients, quality-assured safe implementation of drug therapy is indispensable. Fasting during Ramadan, an essential religious practice for Muslims, affects Muslim diabetics’ drug use in a number of different ways. Objectives: Ethical problems arising from fasting during the month of Ramadan for practicing Muslim patients are being discussed on the basis of extant research literature. Relevant conflicts of interest originating in this situation are being analysed from an ethical perspective. Material and methods: A number of (...) databases have been searched systematically in view of the stated objectives to identify relevant studies. Starting point for this review are the following questions: What information is available regarding the fasting behaviour of Muslim diabetics during Ramadan? What kind of ethical problems can be identified in the context of this religious practice? Results: The present review established a number of problems concerning medication adherence and drug use of practising Muslim diabetics during Ramadan, notably insufficient compliance, reduced frequency of consultations with their doctor, and inadequate, not sufficiently goal-oriented doctor-patient conversations about fasting. Conclusions: Deficiencies in medical as well as religious knowledge about fasting in Ramadan and a lack of sensitivity have been found among Muslim patients as well as among doctors. Compliance management and drug use in this area can be improved by effective, goal-oriented action plans and projects through which linguistic and cultural barriers can be addressed. (shrink)

Bu makale kapsamında, XII. yüzyılda yaşamış önemli Yahudi din âlimlerinden Musa bin Meymûn (öl. 601/1204) ile XVII. yüzyılda yaşamış olan ve düşünceleri neticesinde ateist olduğu suçlamasıyla yirmi dört yaşındayken aforoz edilip bağlı bulunduğu Yahudi cemaatinden kovulan Spinoza’nın (öl. 1088/1677) vahiy ve nübüvvet anlayışları ele alınmıştır. Spinoza, Teolojik-Politik İnceleme adlı eserinde, teolojinin felsefeden ayrılması gerekliliğini göstermek amacındadır. Spinoza’nın bu arzusu onu, İbn Meymûn’la ve onun temsil ettiği gelenekle karşı karşıya getirmiştir. Neticede Spinoza’nın vahiy ve nübüvvet konusunda İbn Meymûn’dan etkilendiği ve onunla (...) bir hesaplaşmaya girdiği görülmektedir. Onun İbn Meymûn’dan hangi bakımdan etkilendiği ya da onunla nasıl bir hesaplaşmaya girdiği makalenin asıl konusunu teşkil etmektedir. Çalışmamız giriş, ana bölüm ve sonuç olarak üç bölümden oluşmaktadır. Giriş bölümünde öncelikle vahiy kavramının ne ifade ettiğine ve hem İslam düşünürlerinin hem de İbn Meymûn’un beslendiği ana kaynak olması nedeniyle Platon ile Aristoteles’in kehanet ve rüya hakkındaki görüşlerine kısaca değinilmiştir. Ayrıca Spinoza’nın İbn Meymûn’dan etkilenmesi veya onunla hesaplaşmasının, İbn Meymûn’un da mensubu olduğu İslam filozoflarının temsil ettiği gelenekle alakalı olmasından dolayı giriş bölümünde, bazı İslam filozoflarının görüşlerine de ana hatlarıyla değinme gereği duyulmuştur. Bunu yaparken Müslüman filozofların ilklerinden ve en önemlilerinden kabul edilen Kindî (öl. 252/866?), Fârâbî (öl. 339/950) ve İbn Sinâ’nın (öl. 428/1037) düşüncelerine özlü şekilde değinilmesi yeterli görülmüştür. Bu arada tarihsel açıdan İbn Meymûn’la Spinoza arasında bir yerde duran diğer bir Yahudi filozof Levi ben Gershom’un (öl. 745/1344) fikirleri de kısaca ele alınmıştır. Bu filozofların düşüncelerinden yola çıkılarak vahyin mütehayyile kuvvetiyle, ayrıca rüya ve kehanetle ilgisi gösterilmeye çalışılmıştır. Çalışmanın asıl bölümünde ise öncelikle İbn Meymûn’un vahiy ve nübüvvet anlayışı incelenmiş, akabinde bu, Spinoza’nın vahiy ve nübüvvet anlayışıyla mukayese edilmiştir. İbn Meymûn’un nübüvvet anlayışı incelenirken yer yer İslam filozoflarından etkilendiği kısımlara değinilmiştir. Bu mukayesede bilhassa İbn Meymûn’un Delâletu’l-Hâirîn adlı eseriyle Spinoza’nın Teolojik-Politik İnceleme adlı eseri ana kaynaklar olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Bu çalışma neticesinde hem iki düşünürün teolojik yaklaşımının daha iyi anlaşılması hem de Aydınlanmanın müjdecilerinden biri sayılan Spinoza’nın eleştirel dahi olsa İbn Meymûn’a kadar uzanan düşünce kodları gösterilmek istenmiştir. İbn Meymûn’a kadar uzanan bu kodların aynı zamanda İslam düşünce dünyasına uzandığı da vurgulanmak istenmiştir. Bu makalede, konunun kapsamı iki düşünürün peygamber, vahiy ve vahyin oluşmasında rol alan enfüsi ve afaki etmeler ile vahyin dili yönündeki düşünceleriyle sınırlandırılmıştır. İki düşünürün teolojiye ait mucize gibi diğer görüşlerindeki farklılıklar ya da benzerlikler makalenin kapsamı dışında tutulmuştur. (shrink)

One barrier to optimal pain management in the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) is how the healthcare community perceives, and therefore manages, neonatal pain. In this paper, we emphasise that healthcare professionals not only have a professional obligation to care for neonates in the NICU, but that these patients are intrinsically worthy of care. We discuss the conditions that make neonates worthy recipients of pain management by highlighting how neonates are (1) vulnerable to pain and harm, and (2) completely dependent (...) on others for pain management. We argue for a relational account of ethical decision-making in the NICU by demonstrating how an increase in vulnerability and dependence may be experienced by the healthcare community and the neonate’s family. Finally, an ethical framework for decisions around neonatal pain management is proposed, focussing on surrogate decision-making and the importance of compassionate action through both a reflective and an affective empathy. As empathy can be highly motivating against pain, we propose that, in addition to educational programs that raise awareness and knowledge of neonatal pain and pain management, healthcare professionals must cultivate empathy in a collective manner, where all members of the NICU team, including parents, are compassionate decision-makers. (shrink)

Hadis rivâyet etmek konusunda bazı muhaddislerin ihtiyatlı bir tutum sergilediği dikkatlerden kaçmamaktadır. Böyle bir tavra neden olan birçok unsur bulunmakla beraber hadis rivâyetinden geri bırakan etkenler genelde hadislerin asıllarını korumaya yönelik çabalar ve ravilerin konuyla ilgili hassasiyetleri zemininde değerlendirilmiştir. Bu çalışmada hadis rivâyetine engel olan unsur-lar tespit edilmeye çalışılmış, ancak sıhhat endişelerinin oluşturduğu hassasiyetler ve bu konu etrafında ifade edilen râvi titizlikleri ile ilgili hususlar dikkate alınmamıştır. Rivâyet etmekten alıkoyan unsurları kendi içinde güçlü ve zayıf olarak iki grupta ele almak (...) mümkündür. Ancak makalede davranış kalıplarına dönüşmeye sebep olan, etkin unsurlar ifade edilmiştir. Hadis rivâyetine engel olan durumlardan bir kısmı aktarım esnasında ortaya çıkabilecek eklemelere, azaltmalara ve yanılmalara karşı bir bilinç oluşturmak üzere ortaya çıkmıştır. Bunun yanında bir kısım çekinceler de rivâyet etmekten veya rivâyetin kendisinden değil, nakletmek için uygun şartların oluşmadığı harici unsurlardan kaynaklanmıştır. Son olarak hadis rivâyetini azaltan diğer bir unsur, râvilerin bu konuda takip ettiği yöntem ve tarzla ilgilidir. (shrink)